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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Following the December 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, much has been written about the discovery of 
electronically-stored information (“ESI”).  However, as one court noted, 
  
[v]ery little has been written . . . about what is required to 
insure that ESI obtained during discovery is admissible into 
evidence at trial . . . .  This is unfortunate, because 
considering the significant costs associated with discovery 
of ESI, it makes little sense to go to all the bother and 
expense to get electronic information only to have it 
excluded from evidence or rejected from consideration 
during summary judgment because the proponent cannot 
lay a sufficient foundation to get it admitted.1   
 
                                                
* Principal, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia.  B.A., 1994, University 
of Virginia; J.D., 1997, University of Richmond, T.C. Williams School of Law. 
 
** Associate, Odin, Feldman & Pittleman, P.C., Fairfax, Virginia.  B.A., 2005, The 
Pennsylvania State University; J.D., 2010, American University, Washington College of 
Law. 
 
1 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 537-38 (D. Md. 2007). 
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Most information is now communicated, generated, or stored 
electronically.2  As Chief United States Magistrate Judge Grimm of the 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland acknowledged in 
Lorraine v. Markel American Insurance Company,  “[b]ecause it can be 
expected that electronic evidence will constitute much, if not most, of the 
evidence used in future motions practice or at trial, counsel should know 
how to get it right on the first try.”3  This Article is intended to be an 
overview of “how to get it right on the first try,” at least in federal court.4  
The Article is roughly organized according to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, with examples of how those rules have been applied to 
electronic evidence.    
 
[2] It is important to remember that there is nothing “magical” about 
the admission of electronic evidence.  The prevalence of electronic 
evidence has required no substantial changes to the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.5  In analyzing the admissibility of such evidence, it is often best 
to treat it as originating from the most similar, non-electronic source as 
thoughtful application of traditional evidentiary principles will nearly 
always lead to the correct result.6  Thus, while electronic evidence may 
present some unique challenges to admissibility and complicate matters of 
establishing authenticity and foundation, it does not require the proponent 
to discard his knowledge of traditional evidentiary principles or learn 
anything truly new. 
 
                                                
2 See Electronic Discovery in Litigation, INFOLOGY, 1, http://www.infology.net/ 
downloads/The%20Strategic%20Value%20of%20Electronic%20Discovery.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2011). 
 
3 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 585. 
 
4 Id. 
 
5 See Jonathan L. Moore, Moore on Upgrading the Federal Rules of Evidence to 
Accommodate ESI, LEGAL INFORMATICS BLOG (June 11, 2010, 9:04 PM), 
http://legalinformatics.wordpress.com/2010/06/11/moore-on-upgrading-the-federal-rules-
of-evidence-to-accommodate-esi/. 
 
6 See Sarah Van Deusen Phillips, The Documentalist, Legal Considerations for 
Electronic Evidence, Part 2: Relevance and Authenticity, WORD PRESS (Apr. 26, 2010), 
http://crlgrn.wordpress.com/2010/04/.  
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II.  TYPES OF ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND THE ANALYTICAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR ADMISSION 
  
[3] Electronically stored information that is admitted as evidence at a 
trial or hearing is electronic evidence.7  It may include: electronic 
communications, such as e-mails, text messages, and chat room 
communications; digital photographs; website content, including social 
media postings; computer-generated data; and computer-stored records.8 
  
[4] The seminal decision addressing the admissibility of electronic 
evidence is Judge Grimm’s 51-page opinion in Lorraine v. Markel 
American Insurance Company, which reads as a comprehensive guide to 
the admission of electronic evidence.9  In Lorraine, Judge Grimm 
describes a decision model for addressing the admission of electronic 
evidence, which, unsurprisingly, is nearly identical to the one many 
proponents apply to the admission of more traditional forms of evidence.10   
  
[5] The Lorraine model suggests that the proponent of electronic 
evidence focus first on relevance, asking whether the electronic evidence 
has any tendency to make some fact that is of consequence to the litigation 
more or less probable than it would be otherwise.11  Second, the proponent 
should address authenticity, asking if he can present evidence 
demonstrating that the electronic evidence is what it purports to be.12  
Third, the proponent must address any hearsay concerns associated with 
                                                
7 See Christine Sgarlata Chung & David J. Byer, The Electronic Paper Trail: Evidentiary 
Obstacles to Discovery and Admission of Electronic Evidence, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 
5, 9 (1998), available at https://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/ 
scitech/volume4/4jstl05.pdf.  
 
8 See Michael D. Gifford, Admitting Electronic Evidence in Federal Court: I’ve Got All 
This Evidence Data – Now What Do I Do With It?, AM. B. ASS’N, 2 (2008), 
http://www.abanet.org/labor/basics/elist/papers/lied.pdf.  
 
9 See generally Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. 534. 
 
10 Compare Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 537-38, with Gifford, supra note 8, at 4.  
 
11 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 540 (citing FED. R. EVID. 401). 
 
12 See id. at 541-42. 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 2 
 4 
the electronic evidence, asking if it is a statement by the declarant, other 
than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and, if the electronic 
information is hearsay, whether an exclusion or exception to the hearsay 
rule applies.13  Fourth, the proponent must address the application of the 
original documents rule.14  Fifth, and finally, the proponent should 
consider “whether the probative value of the [electronic] evidence is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[,]” confusion, 
or waste of time.15  Careful consideration of these traditional evidentiary 
principles will permit a proponent to successfully admit electronic 
evidence. 
 
III. RELEVANCE CONSIDERATIONS 
 
A.  Logical Relevance 
 
[6] Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence is 
generally admissible, and irrelevant evidence is not.16 “Relevant evidence” 
is defined as evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”17  Rules 
401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence address this fundamental 
question of “logical relevance.”18     
                                                
13 See id. at 562-63. 
 
14 See id. at 576. 
 
15 See id. at 583.  On this last consideration, we will depart from Judge Grimm’s model 
and instead address logical relevance (the first consideration in the Lorraine model) 
together with pragmatic relevance (the fifth and final consideration in the Lorraine 
model). 
 
16 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided 
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by [the Federal Rules of 
Evidence], or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory 
authority.”). 
 
17 FED. R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).  This question is “different from whether 
evidence is sufficient to prove a point.”  Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541 (emphasis omitted). 
 
18 See FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 402. 
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[7] As one might expect, demonstrating that evidence has any 
tendency to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to adjudication of 
the action is not particularly difficult.19  The Federal Rules’ logical 
relevance test is quite yielding, particularly in light of the fact that a 
court’s determination of logical relevance is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard.20  This test is applied to electronic evidence in the 
same way that it is applied to more traditional forms of evidence.21  To 
those accustomed to applying the Federal Rules’ logical relevance test to 
more traditional forms of evidence, the test’s application to electronic 
evidence is fairly intuitive; it seems that, even under the view that 
electronic evidence is fundamentally strange or “magical,” logical 
relevance is logical relevance.  
 
B.  Pragmatic Relevance 
 
[8] Even logically relevant evidence may be held inadmissible “if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence.”22  Under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, this test of “pragmatic relevance” focuses only on unfair 
                                                
19 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 541 (“Establishing that ESI has some relevance generally 
is not hard for counsel.”). 
 
20 See United States v. Becton, 601 F.3d 588, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating that 
determinations of the district courts concerning relevancy are reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion); United States v. Alvarez, 358 F.3d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(acknowledging the wide discretion afforded to trial judges in determining whether 
evidence is relevant and noting that a reviewing court will only consider “whether the 
decision was based on relevant factors and whether there was ‘a clear error of 
judgment.’”) (quoting United States v. Soulard, 730 F.2d 1292, 1296 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 
21 Compare Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 32, 38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (holding that 
threatening text messages from a husband to his wife in the months preceding her murder 
were relevant to show that the husband’s decision to murder his wife was deliberate and 
premeditated), with State v. Corwin, 295 S.W.3d 572, 579 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (holding 
that a rape victim’s Facebook postings, which showed her dancing and drinking with men 
other than the accused rapist, were not relevant). 
 
22 FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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prejudice, since all evidence is prejudicial.23  “‘Unfair prejudice’ . . . 
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, 
commonly, though not necessarily an emotional one.”24 
  
[9] Like logical relevance, the Federal Rules’ test for pragmatic 
relevance is applied to electronic evidence in the same way it is applied to 
more traditional forms of evidence.25  A court is most likely to invoke 
Rule 403 to exclude otherwise relevant electronic evidence where such 
evidence:  (1) “contain[s] offensive or highly derogatory language that 
may provoke an emotional response;”26 (2) consists of computer 
animations or simulations where “there is a substantial risk that the jury 
may mistake them for the actual events [at issue] in the litigation;”27 (3) 
consists “of summaries of voluminous electronic writings, recordings or 
                                                
23 Indeed, the purpose of evidence is to prejudice the opposing party.  United States v. 
Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 288 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting that, for purposes of analyzing evidence 
under Rule 403, “it is not enough to simply show that the evidence is prejudicial as 
virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it is not material”) (quoting United States v. Rocha 
916 F.2d 219, 239 (5th Cir. 1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Dollar v. Long 
Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Of course, ‘unfair prejudice’ as 
used in Rule 403 is not to be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing 
party.  Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn’t material.  The prejudice must be 
‘unfair.’”). 
 
24 FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee’s note. 
 
25 See, e.g., Monotype Corp. v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming a trial court’s decision to exclude e-mails that would have been overly 
prejudicial to the opposing party and would have confused the jury). 
 
26 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 584 (D. Md. 2007) (citation omitted) 
(discussing electronic evidence); see also Monotype, 43 F.3d at 450 (holding that a 
district court did not err in excluding e-mails under Rule 403 because they were 
derogatory in nature and lacked probative value). 
 
27 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 584 (citation omitted) (discussing electronic evidence); see 
also State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 210 (Tenn. 2002) (excluding an animation under 
Tennessee’s counterpart to Rule 403 because the animation was based upon inaccurate 
and incomplete information and depicted the accident a total of fifteen times, which the 
court suggested was unduly cumulative). 
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photographs under Rule 1006;”28 or (4) is potentially unreliable or 
inaccurate.29 
 
IV.   AUTHENTICATION 
 
A.  Requirement of Authentication of Electronic Evidence 
 
[10] Before being admitted, evidence must be authenticated – that is, 
the proponent of the evidence must make a showing sufficient to support a 
finding that the evidence is what it purports to be.30  A “[c]ourt need not 
find that the evidence is necessarily what the proponent claims, but only 
that there is sufficient evidence that the jury ultimately might do so.”31 
 
[11] As Judge Grimm noted in Lorraine:   
   
[C]ounsel often fail to meet even this minimal 
showing when attempting to introduce ESI, which 
underscores the need to pay careful attention to this 
requirement.  Indeed, the inability to get evidence admitted 
because of a failure to authenticate it almost always is a 
self-inflicted injury which can be avoided by thoughtful 
advance preparation.32   
 
Due to the common perception that electronic records may be readily 
altered to appear to be something they are not,33 “[a]uthenticity is often the 
                                                
28 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 584 (citation omitted) (discussing electronic evidence). 
 
29 See id. (citation omitted) (discussing electronic evidence); Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 210 
(excluding an animation of a car accident where the depiction was inconsistent with 
testimony regarding the speed of the vehicle and thus likely to be inaccurate). 
 
30 See FED. R. EVID. 901. 
 
31 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 542 (quoting United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 38 
(D.D.C. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
32 Id. at 542. 
 
33 See Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, Don’t Let Your E-Evidence Get Trashed, 
LAW TECHNOLOGY NEWS (June 11, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/ 
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central battleground for determining admissibility of electronic 
evidence.”34 
  
[12] The proponent of electronic evidence often has to swim against the 
tide of a judiciary that is highly skeptical of such evidence.35  Perhaps 
nowhere is such skepticism better articulated than in a decade-old decision 
from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
addressing the admissibility of information discovered on the Internet: 
 
While some look to the Internet as an innovative vehicle for 
communication, the Court continues to warily and wearily 
view it largely as one large catalyst for rumor, innuendo, 
and misinformation.  So as to not mince words, the Court 
reiterates that this so-called Web provides no way of 
verifying the authenticity of the alleged contentions that 
Plaintiff wishes to rely upon in his Response to 
Defendant’s Motion.  There is no way Plaintiff can 
overcome the presumption that the information he 
discovered on the Internet is inherently untrustworthy.  
Anyone can put anything on the Internet.  No web-site is 
monitored for accuracy and nothing contained therein is 
under oath or even subject to independent verification 
absent underlying documentation.  Moreover, the Court 
holds no illusions that hackers can adulterate the content on 
any web-site from any location at any time.  For these 
reasons, any evidence procured off the Internet is adequate 
                                                                                                                     
PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1181293533711 (“[A]ltering an e-mail takes nothing more than 
an impure heart and a keystroke.”); Gifford, supra note 8, at 3 (“In the era when paper 
statements were dropped into a manila file until needed again, alteration or tampering 
was relatively easy to detect. . . . [W]ith paperless data greater attention must be given to 
the foundation necessary to establish the security of stored data.”). 
 
34 Keiko L. Sugisaka, Admissibility of E-Evidence in Minnesota:  New Problems or 
Evidence as Usual?  35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1453, 1459 (2009). 
 
35 See Steven Goode, The Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 29 REV. LITIG. 1, 2 
(2009).  
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for almost nothing, even under the most liberal 
interpretation of the hearsay exception rules . . . .36 
 
[13] The Southern District of Texas’s early distrust of electronic 
evidence has been shared, and discussed with equal force, by Federal 
Courts across the country.37  Though this distrust is often applied to 
evidence obtained from the Internet, it is equally apparent where courts 
address the admissibility of e-mail and other electronic evidence.38   
  
[14] However, some courts seem less willing to dismiss electronic 
evidence based on the mere fact that such evidence is susceptible to 
alteration.39  Indeed, some courts will admit, for example, e-mails, after a 
threshold showing of authenticity and then leave the determination of 
whether thee-mails were altered for the jury.40   
 
B.  Authenticating Evidence by Extrinsic Evidence 
 
[15] Rule 901(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth a non-
exclusive list identifying ten ways extrinsic evidence may authenticate 
                                                
36 St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773, 774-75 (S.D. Tex. 
1999) (holding that “voodoo information taken from the Internet” was insufficient to 
withstand a motion to dismiss). 
 
37 See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 208 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2000) (expressing 
skepticism over the admissibility of Internet web postings as a business record, 
particularly in light of the fact that the proponent presented no evidence that the ISP 
monitored the contents of the website); see also Wady v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. 
Co., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (quoting the St. Clair court and 
acknowledging that information retrieved from the Internet is inherently unreliable and 
easily distorted). 
 
38 See Leah Voigt Romano, Developments in the Law: Electronic Discovery; VI: 
Electronic Evidence and the Federal Rules, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1745, 1801 (2005). 
 
39 See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The 
possibility of alteration does not and cannot be the basis for excluding e-mails as 
unidentified or unauthenticated as a matter of course, any more than it can be the 
rationale for excluding paper documents (and copies of those documents).”). 
 
40 See id.   
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evidence for admission.41  Though this list was prepared with more 
traditional forms of evidence in mind, most of the listed methods of 
authentication are easily applied to electronic evidence.42 
  
1.  Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge 
 
[16] Under Rule 901(b)(1), a proponent may authenticate evidence 
through testimony that the evidence “is what it is claimed to be.”43  For 
non-electronic documents, the witness providing such testimony may be 
the person who drafted the document or who is responsible for 
maintaining the record.44  For electronic evidence, the witness providing 
such testimony may be the person who created the electronic document or 
maintains the evidence in its electronic form.45 
 
[17] Generally, a witness authenticating electronic evidence must 
“provide factual specificity about the process by which the electronically 
stored information is created, acquired, maintained, and preserved without 
alteration or change, or the process by which it is produced if the result of 
a system or process that does so.”46  Failure to provide such testimony 
may result in the subject electronic evidence being held to be 
inadmissible.47 
                                                
41 See FED. R. EVID. 901(b). 
 
42 Obviously, the methods described in FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(2) (Nonexpert Opinion on 
Handwriting), FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5) (Voice Identification), and FED. R. EVID. 
901(b)(6) (Telephone Conversations) do not typically apply to electronic evidence.  The 
remaining methods do. 
 
43 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1). 
 
44 See United States v. Locke, 425 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that records 
were properly authenticated through the testimony of the custodian of records). 
 
45 See United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that a chat log 
was properly authenticated by the testimony of a witness who participated in, and thus 
created, the chat).  
 
46 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 545 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
47 See, e.g., Am. Express Travel Related Servs. v. Vinhnee (In re Vee Vinhnee), 336 B.R. 
437, 447 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (holding that computer records were not properly 
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2.  Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness 
 
[18] Under Rule 901(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, either an 
expert witness or the trier of fact may authenticate evidence by comparing 
it to properly authenticated specimens.48  While this method was originally 
intended to authenticate handwriting or signatures,49 it has recently been 
used to authenticate electronic communications as well.50 
 
3.  Distinctive Characteristics and the Like 
 
[19] Under Rule 901(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a party 
may authenticate evidence using circumstantial evidence in conjunction 
with the “[a]ppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other 
distinctive characteristics” of the evidence.51  This is one of the most 
common methods of authenticating evidence.52 
 
[20] Where a witness testifies that an e-mail or text message originated 
from the known e-mail address or screen name of another person, courts 
will often find that the e-mail or text message is an authentic 
communication from the purported sender.53  This is particularly true 
                                                                                                                     
authenticated where the authenticating witness’ testimony was vague, unpersuasive, and 
conclusory, and demonstrated a lack of knowledge regarding the relevant hardware and 
software). 
 
48 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3). 
 
49 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 546 (citing FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(3) advisory committee’s 
note).  
 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006) (permitting 
the authentication of e-mails by comparison to other e-mails already authenticated under 
Federal Rule 901(b)(4)). 
 
51 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(4). 
 
52 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 546. 
 
53 See, e.g., People v. Pierre, 838 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (holding, 
under New York’s adaptation of Rule 901(b)(3), that an instant message was properly 
authenticated as a communication from the defendant after “[t]he accomplice witness . . .  
testified to defendant’s [instant messenger] screen name. . . . [and] that she sent an instant 
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology        Vol. XVII, Issue 2 
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where the content of the e-mail or text message reveals additional indicia 
of authenticity.54 
 
[21] Authenticating other electronic evidence under Rule 901(b)(4) may 
involve the use of “hash values” or “metadata.”55  A hash value is “[a] 
unique numerical identifier that can be assigned to a file, a group of files, 
or a portion of a file, based on a standard mathematical algorithm applied 
to the characteristics of the data set.”56  An electronic document’s hash 
value may constitute a distinguishing trait permitting authentication under 
Federal Rule 901(b)(4).57 
 
[22] Metadata is “information describing the history, tracking, or 
management of an electronic document.”58  This “data about data” 
pertaining to the evidence in question may constitute a distinctive 
characteristic permitting authentication under Rule 901(b)(4).59  However, 
this method of authentication is not entirely foolproof; network 
                                                                                                                     
message to that screen name, and received a reply, the content of which made no sense 
unless it was sent by defendant [and] there was no evidence that anyone had a motive, or 
opportunity, to impersonate defendant by using his screen name.”); see also Simon v. 
State, 279 Ga. App. 844, 847 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding, under Georgia’s version of 
Rule 901(b)(3), that e-mail correspondence between the defendant and his minor victim 
was properly authenticated “where . . . the witness testified that the [e-mails] accurately 
reflect[ed] the exchange between the parties, the witness communicated with the 
defendant at his known e-mail address,” and the e-mail from the defendant referenced the 
defendant’s nickname). 
 
54 See Simon, 279 Ga. App. at 847. 
 
55 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 546-47 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
56 Id. (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONIC 
INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 24 (2007)). 
 
57 Id. at 547. 
 
58 Id. (quoting Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 646 (D. Kan. 
2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
59 Id. at 547-48 (quoting Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 646) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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administrators and other users on the same network may access or alter 
electronic files stored on network computers.60  
 
4.  Public Records or Reports 
 
[23] Under Rule 901(b)(7) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a 
document may be authenticated by “[e]vidence that a writing authorized 
by law to be recorded or filed and in fact recorded or filed in a public 
office, or a purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, 
in any form, is from the public office where items of this nature are 
kept.”61  “[T]he ‘proponent of the evidence need only show that the office 
from which the records were taken is the legal custodian of the records;’” 
which may be accomplished through “‘[t]he testimony of an officer who is 
authorized to attest to custodianship,’” or through “‘[a] certificate of 
authenticity from the public office’” authorized to maintain the records.62  
Concerns about the accuracy of such evidence go to the weight of that 
evidence, not its admissibility.63 
 
5.  Ancient Documents 
 
[24] Ancient documents may be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(8) of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence if the document “(A) is in such condition as 
to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, (B) was in a place where 
it, if authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been in existence 20 years or 
                                                
60 Id. at 548 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE  § 900.01 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)). 
 
61 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(7). 
 
62 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 548 (quoting JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. 
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE  § 901.10 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)). 
 
63 See United States v. Meienberg, 263 F.3d 1177, 1181 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Any question as to the accuracy of the 
printouts, whether resulting from incorrect data entry or the operation of the computer 
program, as with inaccuracies in any other type of business records, would have affected 
only the weight of the printouts, not their admissibility.”). 
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more at the time it is offered.”64  The Sixth Circuit has noted that despite 
the Rule’s mandate “that the document be free of suspicion . . . suspicion 
goes not to the content of the document, but rather to whether the 
document is what it purports to be.”65  The theory behind this method is 
that, because of the age of the document, its author or creator is likely 
unavailable to testify regarding its authenticity; thus, courts must look to 
circumstantial evidence to guarantee the genuineness of the document.66   
 
[25] This method of authentication is also significant in that it can 
qualify an exhibit under a corresponding hearsay exception, so that the 
exhibit may then be admitted for the truth of its contents.67  Under Rule 
803(16) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[s]tatements in a document in 
existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established” 
may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.68  Given the similar 
requirements of Rules 901(b)(8) and 803(16), courts frequently find that 
once a document is authenticated under 901(b)(8), it automatically 
qualifies under 803(16).69  The rationale behind this exception is that, 
because the document was created long before the controversy arose, it is 
less likely that the document was fabricated or altered for purposes of the 
present litigation.70 
                                                
64 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8). 
 
65 United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 966 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. 
Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
66 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 225 (Kenneth S. Broud ed., 6th ed. 2006) (listing 
facts that support the genuineness of a document, such as “unsuspicious appearance, 
emergence from natural custody, prompt recording, and, in the case of a deed or will, 
possession taken under the instrument.”). 
 
67 Fagiola v. Nat’l Gypsum Co. AC & S., 906 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 
68 FED. R. EVID. 803(16). 
 
69 See Fagiola, 906 F.2d at 58. 
 
70 See Columbia First Bank, FSB v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 333, 336 (Fed. Cl. 2003).  
The court noted the advisory committee’s observation that “age affords assurance that the 
writing antedates the present controversy.” Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 803(16) advisory 
committee’s note). 
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[26] While 901(b)(8) has not been widely used to authenticate 
electronic evidence, the advisory committee notes make clear that the Rule 
applies to electronically-stored data.71  The committee explains that “[t]his 
expansion is necessary in view of the widespread use of methods of 
storing data in forms other than conventional written records.”72   
 
[27] This inclusion of electronically stored data may become more 
significant in the coming years, as the twenty-year mark begins to reach 
back to a period when electronic data was becoming more pervasive.  
However, it is uncertain how courts will treat ‘ancient electronic’ evidence 
given the requirement under 901(b)(8) that the evidence be in a condition 
that creates “no suspicion concerning its authenticity.”73 
 
6. Process or System 
  
[28] Under Rule 901(b)(9) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, a 
document may be authenticated by “[e]vidence describing a process or 
system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system 
produces an accurate result.”74  This method is often used to authenticate 
evidence generated by, or stored on, a computer.75 
 
[29] One court has articulated an 11-step process for authenticating 
computer-generated or stored records.76  The court found that to 
authenticate such records, a proponent must establish that:   
 
(1) The business uses a computer.  
(2) The computer is reliable.  
                                                
71 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8) advisory committee’s note.  
 
72 Id. 
 
73 See generally FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(8). 
 
74 FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9). 
 
75 See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee’s note. 
 
76 See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
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(3) The business has developed a procedure for inserting 
data into the computer.  
(4) The procedure has built-in safeguards to ensure 
accuracy and identify errors.  
(5) The business keeps the computer in a good state of 
repair.  
(6) The witness had the computer readout certain data.  
(7) The witness used the proper procedures to obtain the 
readout.  
(8) The computer was in working order at the time the 
witness obtained the readout. 
(9) The witness recognizes the exhibit as the readout.  
(10) The witness explains how he or she recognizes the 
readout.  
(11) If the readout contains strange symbols or terms, the 
witness explains the meaning of the symbols or terms for 
the trier of fact.77 
 
C.  Self-Authenticating Documents 
 
[30] The Federal Rules of Evidence also identify a dozen categories of 
evidence that may be authenticated without extrinsic evidence.78  Each of 
these categories provides an efficient method for authenticating evidence, 
but courts have identified three that are particularly relevant in the 
electronic evidence context.79 
 
1.  Official Publications 
 
[31] “Books, pamphlets, or other publications purporting to be issued 
by public authority” are self-authenticating under Rule 902(5) of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.80 Thus, an e-mail, newsletter, or website 
                                                
77 Id. 
 
78 See FED. R. EVID. 902. 
 
79 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 551 (D. Md. 2007).  
 
80 FED. R. EVID. 902(5). 
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published by a public authority can be self-authenticating but the 
proponent of such evidence might also need to demonstrate that such a 
document satisfies the public record hearsay exception set forth in Rule 
803(8).81 
 
2.  Trade Inscriptions and the Like 
 
[32] Evidence may be authenticated by “[i]nscriptions, signs, tags, or 
labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of business and 
indicating ownership, control, or origin.”82  Many business 
communications, such as e-mails, “‘contain information showing the 
origin of the transmission and identifying the employer-company’” 
meaning “‘[t]he identification marker alone may be sufficient to 
authenticate an e-mail under Rule 902(7).’”83 
   
3.  Certified Domestic Records of Regularly Conducted Activity 
 
[33] Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides a method 
of self-authentication for records of regularly conducted activity.84  This 
method mirrors the requirements of the business records exception to the 
hearsay rule; therefore, courts often analyze it in conjunction with that 
exception.85  The Rule provides that extrinsic evidence of authenticity is 
not required for admissibility if the evidence is an “original or a duplicate 
                                                
81 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551. 
 
82 FED. R. EVID. 902(7). 
 
83 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 551-52 (citing JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 900.07(3)(c) (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew 
Bender 2d ed. 1997)). 
 
84 See FED. R. EVID. 902(11). 
 
85 See DirecTV, Inc. v. Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772 (D.S.C. 2004) (analyzing the 
admissibility of e-mails under Rules 902(11) and 803(6) and noting that the analyses 
under both rules “are necessarily intertwined”); see also Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Tech. 
AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004) (“[T]he most appropriate way to view 
Rule 902(11) is as the functional equivalent of testimony offered to authenticate a 
business record tendered under Rule 803(6).”). 
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of a domestic record of regularly conducted activity that would be 
admissible under Rule 803(6).”86  However, to be self-authenticating the 
record must be:  
 
accompanied by a written declaration of its custodian or other 
qualified person . . . certifying that the record (A) was made at or 
near the time of the occurrence of the matters set forth by . . . a 
person with knowledge of those matters; (B) was kept in the course 
of the regularly conducted activity; and (C) was made . . . as a 
regular practice.87   
 
[34] To properly authenticate, the proponent must show that the 
custodian of the records is “not only . . . familiar with the maintenance of 
the records, but also with how they are created.”88  Furthermore, the 
record must be made pursuant to established procedures and must be kept 
as a regular practice by the business entity, much like the business records 
exception.89   
 
[35] This method of self-authentication is particularly important to 
electronic evidence in light of the fact that most business records today are 
stored in electronic format.90  Thus, not only will a proper declaration self-
authenticate electronic evidence, but the content of the evidence may be 
                                                
86 FED. R. EVID. 902(11). 
 
87 Id. 
 
88 Rambus, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 703 (noting that the bar for qualifying a witness as the 
custodian of records is low). 
 
89 See id. at 704-05 (“It is not enough that a particular employee regularly makes and 
keeps the records as his or her own regular practice because it must be the regular 
practice of the business . . . to make and keep the record at issue.”).  
 
90 See, e.g., DirecTV, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 772 (finding that an electronic dealer’s e-mails 
were properly self-authenticated under Rule 902(11) in light of the custodian of records’ 
testimony that the e-mail records were kept in the normal course of business, were made 
at or near the time the events occurred, and that it was the custom of the business to 
regularly record orders by e-mail and keep those e-mails as records of such orders). 
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admitted for its truth because it qualifies under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule.91 
 
D. Authentication of Certain Types of Electronic Evidence 
 
1.  E-mails and Text Messages 
 
[36] In modern litigation, it is rare when a case does not involve some 
communication by e-mail or text message.92  Such a communication is 
easily authenticated if the proponent of the communication can secure the 
admission of the author or sender of the communication that he drafted or 
sent the communication.93  Additionally, a recipient, 94 or non-recipient 
with knowledge that the communication was sent, 95 may authenticate an 
e-mail or text message. Also, a witness with knowledge of how the 
responsible Internet service providers or wireless telephone carriers sent 
                                                
91 See id. 
 
92 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554 (D. Md. 2007) (“There is no 
form of ESI more ubiquitous than e-mail.”). 
 
93 See Talada v. City of Martinez, 656 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1158 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (finding 
that an e-mail had been properly authenticated by testimony from the sender, and that 
separate e-mails were also properly authenticated by a declaration from the recipient of 
the e-mails that they were accurate and true copies of the e-mails). 
 
94 In People v. Brown, a California court held that text messages from a witness’ cellular 
telephone were properly authenticated in a criminal matter where the witness testified 
that the messages came from the defendant and were “signed” with the defendant’s name.  
People v. Brown, No. A122791, 2009 WL 1878704, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. June 30, 2009).  
The prosecution introduced the messages into evidence by introducing the cellular 
telephone as an exhibit and having the witness identify the telephone and read the 
messages from the telephone aloud.  Id. at *3. 
 
95 In Dickens v. State, a Maryland court held that the testimony of a victim’s mother 
regarding text messages sent to the victim from the victim’s husband before she was 
murdered was sufficient to authenticate those messages under Maryland Rule 5-901(b), 
Maryland’s equivalent to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b).  Dickens v. State, 927 A.2d 
32, 36-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007).  The court also considered circumstantial evidence 
to corroborate the mother’s testimony including the fact that the telephone was found 
near a home the defendant had visited shortly after the shooting and told residents that 
“he had done something to his girlfriend.”  Id. at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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and received an e-mail or text message, and how such messages are stored 
and retrieved, may authenticate such messages.96  The threshold 
determination for authentication will often vary with the piece of evidence 
and the court the evidence is before; however, the Southern District of 
New York characterized this threshold requirement as “relatively low,” 
and held that any remaining issues concerning authenticity should go to 
the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.97    
 
[37] Comparing an e-mail or a text message with other e-mails or text 
messages already authenticated may serve to authenticate the e-mail or 
text message at issue.98  This method is particularly useful in cases where 
the sender/recipient’s e-mail address does not bear any indicia of 
identification.99  For example, the e-mail address “joe.smith@doj.gov,” 
indicates that the address most likely belongs to Joe Smith, who 
presumably works for the Department of Justice.100  
“MerrittDC@aol.com” does not contain the same obvious identifiers, but 
comparing an e-mail from “MerrittDC@aol.com” with a previous e-mail 
from the same address, which has already been independently and 
properly authenticated, will authenticate the latter e-mail, even though it 
does not contain the same information which authenticated the earlier e-
mail.101   
 
2.  Chat Room Communications 
 
[38] A proponent may authenticate chat room communications by 
demonstrating that: (1) the person alleged to be the sender had access to 
                                                
96 See State v. Taylor, 632 S.E.2d 218, 230 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006). 
 
97 See Bazak Int’l Corp. v. Tarrant Apparel Grp., 378 F. Supp. 2d 377, 391-92 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 
98 See United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 
99 See, e.g., id. 
 
100 See id. 
 
101 See id. at 40-41 (comparing an e-mail from “MerrittDC@aol.com” with a previously 
authenticated e-mail and finding the subsequent e-mail properly authenticated).  
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the computer from which the chats were conducted; (2) the chats in 
question were conducted at the same time as chats the defendant admitted 
to conducting; (3) the chats were conducted using a screen name created 
by the defendant; and (4) the content of the chats was similar to chats the 
defendant admitted to conducting.102  Additionally, a proponent seeking to 
admit transcripts of chat room dialogue must ensure that the transcripts 
accurately reflect the conversation.103  Cutting and pasting portions of the 
chat in a way that alters the context of the communication or that fails to 
preserve the temporal integrity of the chat (for example, a chat room post 
time-stamped at 1:00 p.m., followed by a chat room post time-stamped at 
12:45 p.m.), may raise suspicion and prevent such transcripts from being 
properly authenticated.104   
 
[39] An even greater challenge in admitting chat room transcripts is 
proving the identity of the participants.105  With no face-to-face interaction 
and screen names that often give no indication of the user’s real name, 
identifying the parties to the conversation is often a difficult hurdle to 
overcome.106  To authenticate chat room transcripts, parties often use 
circumstantial evidence, such as a witness testifying that she had 
previously communicated with a certain screen name, that the responses 
from the screen name would have not made sense were they not from a 
particular person, and that no one else had a motive to impersonate that 
particular person.107 
                                                
102 See United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 524 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 
103 See United States v. Jackson, 488 F. Supp. 2d 866, 871 (D. Neb. 2007). 
 
104 See id. at 870-71 (finding that a Microsoft Word document containing cut-and-paste 
portions of an online chat was not properly authenticated because there were several 
instances of missing information, and some of the timing sequences were not in order).  
 
105 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 855 (1997) (discussing the 
difficulty of determining the identity of chat room participants). 
 
106 See id. at 890. 
 
107 See People v. Pierre, 838 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (N.Y App. Div. 2007) (finding that a 
chat room conversation was properly authenticated through circumstantial evidence even 
though the witness did not save the conversation and no printable version was available 
to the court); In re F.P., 878 A.2d 91, 95-96 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (considering 
circumstantial evidence in admitting Instant Message chats). 
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3.  Websites 
 
[40] Website authentication raises three distinct issues: “(1) What was 
actually on the website?  (2) Does the exhibit or testimony accurately 
reflect it?  (3) If so, is it attributable to the owner of the site?”108  To 
address these questions, a proponent must often provide a witness with 
personal knowledge of the website who can testify “‘that the printout 
accurately reflects the content of the page and the image of the page on the 
computer at which the printout was made.’”109   
 
[41] A proponent also may authenticate a website under Rule 901(b)(4) 
when the printout contains distinctive characteristics that, combined with 
circumstantial evidence, show that the printout is what it purports to be.110  
While a highly fact-specific inquiry, the level of scrutiny applied to 
website printouts will often vary according to the particular website.111  
For example, current printouts from reputable business sites, such as 
bankofamerica.com or verizon.com, are less likely to be subject to the 
same scrutiny as the online-encyclopedia Wikipedia, a blog, or another 
website where content is easily manipulated.112  Additional concerns may 
                                                
108 Goode, supra note 35 at 11.  
 
109 See Toytrackerz LLC v. Koehler, No. 08-2297-GLR, 2009 WL 2591329, at *6 (D. 
Kan. Aug. 21, 2009) (quoting Nightlight Sys., Inc. v. Nitelites Franchise Sys., Inc., 2007 
WL 4563875, at *6 (N.D. Ga. May 11, 2007)) (finding that the proponent of various 
website printouts failed to authenticate them because there was no indication as to who 
retrieved the printout, when and how the pages were printed, or on what basis the 
printouts accurately reflected the website on a particular date); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1154 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a 
plaintiff properly authenticated printouts from a website where he submitted declarations 
sufficient to show that the pictures were what they purported to be). 
 
110 See Goode, supra note 35, at 29. 
 
111 See id. 
 
112 See id. 
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be raised regarding an author’s identity, especially in the context of 
defamatory postings on blogs or other websites.113      
 
[42] Even more dubious is content obtained from older versions of a 
website.  If such content has not been archived by the operator of the 
website, the proponent may be forced to seek the admission of the website 
content as archived by the Internet Archive Company at 
http://www.archive.org.114  Authentication of such evidence may be 
accomplished through testimony or affidavit that the Internet Archive 
Company retrieved copies of the website as it appeared on the dates in 
question from its electronic archives.115  Though “the Internet Archive 
does not fit neatly into any of the non-exhaustive examples listed in Rule 
901” and “is a relatively new source for archiving websites,” at least one 
district court has held that, absent evidence that the Internet Archive is 
biased or unreliable, or evidence contesting the veracity of the proposed 
exhibit, such testimony or affidavit is sufficient to satisfy the threshold 
requirement for admissibility – that is, a prima facie showing of 
genuineness.116  By contrast, printouts from official government websites 
have been held to be self-authenticating under Rule 902(5) of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which provides that books, pamphlets, or other 
publications purporting to be issued by public authority are self-
authenticating.117  
 
 
 
                                                
113 See Wendler & Ezra, P.C. v. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., 521 F.3d 790, 791-92 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding that a plaintiff failed to link a defamatory post on a third party website to 
the defendant).  
 
114 See Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C 3293, 2004 WL 
2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004).  
 
115 See id. 
 
116 Id. 
 
117 Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. McPherson, No. C 06-4670 SBA, 2008 WL 4183981, at 
*7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008) (holding that printouts from the California Secretary of State 
website were self-authenticating under Rule 902(5)).  
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4.  Computer-Generated Records 
 
[43] The authenticity of computer-generated records is generally shown 
through the testimony of a witness with knowledge of how the records are 
recorded, stored and maintained.118  However, given the wide disparity 
among courts concerning the admission of computer-generated records, 
the difficulty in preparing such evidence is determining the level of 
scrutiny the court will apply to the evidence when assessing its 
authenticity.119  
  
[44] Courts on one end of the spectrum will allow authentication of 
computer-generated evidence by a person “who has knowledge of the 
particular record system.”120  This camp does not require computer 
programmers or experts to testify as to the accuracy and intricacies of the 
particular computer program.121  Rather, the proponent is only held to the 
standard of showing that the records were sufficiently precise and that the 
company relied upon such records in its business practices.122   
   
[45] On the other end of the spectrum, courts require a much more 
rigorous process in order to make a sufficient showing that a computer-
                                                
118 See U-Haul Int'l Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 576 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 
2009) (finding that computer-generated records were properly authenticated through 
testimony “regarding the process of inputting data into the computer and the process of 
querying the computer to compile the information”); see also Hardison v. Balboa Ins. 
Co., 4 F. App'x 663, 669 (10th Cir. 2001) (permitting the authentication of computer-
generated records through affidavits and verified answers to interrogatories).   
 
119 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559 (D. Md. 2007) (advising 
lawyers “to plan to authenticate the record by the most rigorous standard that may be 
applied”).  
 
120 See U-Haul, 576 F.3d at 1045 (quoting United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 
(9th Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
121 See id. 
 
122 See id. 
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generated record is what it purports to be.123  These courts require specific 
testimony regarding not only the procedures for storing and maintaining 
the data, but also concerning the functionality of the particular hardware 
and software used to store, compute, and maintain the data.124  Because 
the person inputting data is rarely familiar with the inner-workings of 
computer hardware or software, the proponent of such evidence will often 
need to retain an expert to explain these processes to the satisfaction of the 
court.125      
 
V.  HEARSAY 
 
A.  Hearsay 
 
[46] “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.”126  In this context, “[a] ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct . . . intended . . . as an 
assertion,”127 and “[a] ‘declarant’ is a person who makes a statement.”128   
   
1.  Statement 
 
[47] Evidence that does not meet the definition of a “statement” under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence is not hearsay.129  “[F]or verbal or 
                                                
123 See In re Vee Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (listing "built-in 
safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify errors" as part of an eleven-step authentication 
process). 
 
124 See id. at 447 (noting that the witness’ testimony concerning American Express’ 
computer records was “vague, conclusory, and, in light of the assertion that ‘[t]here’s no 
way that the computer changes numbers,’ unpersuasive”) (citation omitted). 
 
125 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
126 FED. R. EVID. 801(c).   
 
127 FED. R. EVID. 801(a).   
 
128 FED. R. EVID. 801(b) (emphasis added).   
 
129 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
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nonverbal conduct to fall within the definition of the hearsay rule as 
defined under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it must be either an 
expressly assertive written or spoken utterance, or nonverbal conduct 
expressly intended to be an assertion – the federal rules appear to have 
excluded from the definition of hearsay ‘implied assertions’ . . . .”130  An 
example of this concept is the following:  A man stepping outside and 
opening his umbrella.131  The man did not intend to assert that it is raining 
outside when he opened his umbrella, thus, his conduct was 
nonassertive.132  Accordingly, a witness’s testimony that the man stepped 
outside and opened his umbrella, offered to show that it was raining, is not 
hearsay.133 
 
2.  Declarant 
 
[48] To be hearsay, the statement must be made by a person, the 
“declarant,” not an animal or machine.134  For example, when a dog 
trained to detect illegal substances finds drugs in the trunk of a car, 
hearsay is not an issue – the declarant is not a person.135  But when a nun 
witnesses an accident and states what she saw, the dangers of faulty 
memory, perception, and ambiguity remain, even though the nun is less 
likely to lie about the events.136  When viewed across the range of dogs to 
                                                
130 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 563; see United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 44 
(D.D.C. 2006) (explaining that an e-mail containing imperative statements is non-
assertive verbal conduct and not hearsay). 
 
131 See Paul S. Milich, Re-Examining Hearsay Under the Federal Rules: Some Method 
for the Madness, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 893, 903 (1991). 
  
132 See id. 
 
133 See id. (“Opening an umbrella normally is not intended to be an assertion about 
anything, and, thus, such nonverbal conduct does not fall within the federal definition of 
hearsay.”). 
 
134 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c), see also John C. O’Brien, The Hearsay Within 
Confrontation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501, 520 (2010). 
 
135 See O’Brien, supra note 134. 
 
136 PAUL R. RICE, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 199-200 n.12 (2005). 
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nuns, nothing to the left of dogs creates a hearsay problem.137  Thus, 
machines, which are to the left of dogs, fall outside the scope of hearsay 
“because the hearsay problems of perception, memory, sincerity and 
ambiguity have either been addressed or eliminated.”138 
 
[49] In the context of electronic evidence, the concept of a declarant is 
often tested in the consideration of computer-generated evidence.139  As 
the court stated in Lorraine: 
  
When an electronically generated record is entirely the 
product of the functioning of a computerized system or 
process, such as the “report” generated when a fax is sent 
showing the number to which the fax was sent and the time 
it was received, there is no “person” involved in the 
creation of the record, and no “assertion” being made.  For 
that reason, the record is not a statement and cannot be 
hearsay.140 
 
3. Offered to Prove the Truth of the Matter Asserted 
 
[50] If a statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, the statement is not hearsay.141  Thus, verbal acts and legally 
operative facts, such as the fact that a contract was formed, are not hearsay 
                                                
137 See id. 
 
138 Id. 
 
139 See generally Adam Wolfson, “Electronic Fingerprints”: Doing Away with the 
Conception of Computer-Generated Records as Hearsay, 104 MICH. L. REV. 151, 159 
(2005). 
 
140 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 564 (D. Md. 2007); see United 
States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498, 506 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that a fax header was 
not a statement and thus not hearsay because it was created by a machine). 
 
141 See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) advisory committee’s note (“If the significance of an offered 
statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of 
anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”). 
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because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted.142  
Obviously, one must consider the purpose of offering evidence in the 
hearsay analysis, because evidence may be admissible for one purpose but 
inadmissible for another.143 
 
4.  Inadmissibility 
 
[51] Generally, hearsay is inadmissible.144  “The hearsay rule excludes 
such evidence because it possesses testimonial dangers of perception, 
memory, sincerity, and ambiguity that cannot be tested through oath and 
cross-examination.”145 
 
B. Hearsay Exclusions 
 
[52] By express exclusion under the Federal Rules of Evidence, certain 
prior statements by a witness and certain admissions by a party-opponent 
are not hearsay.146   Courts often apply this latter exclusion, for admissions 
of a party-opponent, to electronic evidence.147  “Given the near universal 
                                                
142 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 567 n.50 (“A verbal act is an utterance of an operative 
fact that gives rise to legal consequences.  Verbal acts, also known as statements of legal 
consequence, are not hearsay, because the statement is admitted merely to show that it 
was actually made, not to prove the truth of what was asserted in it.”); see, e.g., 
Transportes Aereos Pegaso, S.A. v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 518, 
530 (D. Del. 2009) (holding that hearsay evidence of a declarant soliciting a bride was a 
verbal act and thus fell outside of the hearsay rule); Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249, 1254 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (noting that examples of verbal acts include language in will 
bequests, offer and acceptance, and libel or slander). 
 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that 
an e-mail between the defendant and a co-worker was not hearsay because it was not 
offered to prove the truth of the statements contained in the e-mail but instead to 
demonstrate that a relationship between the two existed). 
 
144 See FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 
145 RICE, supra note 136, at 262. 
 
146 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
 
147 See Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 
Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 2d 966, 973 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that e-mails sent by corporate 
employees were admissible as admissions by a party’s agent under Rule 801(d)(2)). 
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use of electronic means of communication, it is not surprising that 
statements contained in electronically made or stored evidence often have 
been found to qualify as admissions by a party opponent if offered against 
that party.”148 
 
C.  Hearsay Exceptions 
 
[53] While the hearsay rule may operate to exclude a vast array of 
evidence, the numerous and expansive exceptions to the rule operate to 
include more than the rule excludes.149  Among these exceptions are Rules 
803 and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which list twenty-eight 
exceptions to the hearsay rule.150  In addition, Rule 807 provides a residual 
exception for statements bearing “circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”151  If a statement falls under one of these exceptions, the 
content of the proffered evidence is admissible for its truth.152  The 
following hearsay exceptions are most commonly used when dealing with 
electronic evidence.   
 
1.  Present Sense Impression 
 
[54] “A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made 
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately 
thereafter” is not excluded by the hearsay rule, regardless of whether the 
declarant is available to testify at the trial or hearing.153  
Contemporaneousness is the key to this exception; such statements are 
considered trustworthy because the declarant simultaneously perceives the 
                                                
148 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 568 (citations omitted); see also MGM Studios, 454 F. Supp. 
2d at 973. 
 
149 See generally FED. R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 
150 See generally FED. R. EVID. 803; FED. R. EVID. 804. 
 
151 FED. R. EVID. 807. 
 
152 FED R. EVID. 801(c). 
 
153 FED. R. EVID. 803(1). 
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event and makes a statement concerning the event, thereby minimizing the 
dangers of poor memory or insincerity.154 
 
[55] Statements made in an e-mail or a human-generated but computer-
stored record may qualify as a present sense impression in the same way 
as a more traditional letter or hardcopy record.155  Moreover, though they 
have no close analogue in the non-electronic world, social networking 
posts assemble the present sense impressions of millions upon millions of 
users.156 
 
2.  Excited Utterance 
 
[56] “A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or 
condition” also survives the hearsay rule, regardless of whether the 
declarant is available to testify at the trial or hearing.157  The Lorraine 
court noted that “[t]he theory behind [this] exception is that perception of 
a startling or exciting event produces in the declarant an emotional state 
that reduces the likelihood that the description of the event while under 
this emotional state will be inaccurate or purposely misstated.”158  
Therefore, e-mails, human-created but computer-stored records, and social 
                                                
154 See FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee’s note. 
 
155 See United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 99 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that an e-
mail from the defendant’s co-worker describing a conversation with the defendant was 
admissible as a present sense impression because it was prepared shortly after the 
conversation).  But see State v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233(CKK), 2002 WL 
649951, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002) (finding that an e-mail discussing events from days 
prior was not admissible under the present sense impression exception because the e-mail 
was not composed while the declarant was perceiving an event or immediately 
thereafter). 
 
156 See Bass v. Miss Porter’s Sch., No. 3:08cv1807 (JBA), 2009 WL 3724968, at *1 (D. 
Conn. Oct. 27, 2009) (“Facebook usage depicts a snapshot of the user’s relationships and 
state of mind at the time of the content’s posting.”). 
 
157 FED. R. EVID. 803(2). 
 
158 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 569 (D. Md. 2007) (citing FED. R. 
EVID. 803(2)). 
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media postings can all constitute excited utterances so long as they are 
created under the “stress of excitement” caused by a startling event or 
condition.159 
 
3.  Then Existing State of Mind or Condition 
 
[57] The Federal Rules of Evidence also exclude statements by 
declarants concerning their state of mind or condition from the hearsay 
exception.160  Rule 803(3) provides for the admissibility of: 
 
[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, 
emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, 
plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily 
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief 
to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to 
the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of 
declarant's will.161 
  
[58] Like the present sense impression exclusion listed in Rule 803(1), 
contemporaneousness is key to this exception.162  As the Lorraine court 
noted, this exception:  
 
has been used to prove a wide variety of matters, including 
the reason why the declarant would not deal with a supplier 
or dealer, motive, competency, ill-will, . . . lack of intent to 
defraud, willingness to engage in criminal conduct, the 
                                                
159 See Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“An excited 
utterance must be made under the ‘stress of excitement,’ and any amount of time that 
passes between the exciting event and the statement will remove the declarant from the 
stress of the situation.”). 
 
160 FED R. EVID. 803(3). 
 
161 Id. These statements are excluded from the hearsay rule regardless of whether the 
declarant is available to testify at the trial or hearing.  Id. 
 
162 Fed. R. Evid. 803(3) advisory committee’s note (explaining that Rule 803 is 
essentially the same as Rule 801). 
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victim’s state of mind in an extortion case, and confusion 
or secondary meaning in a trademark infringement case.163   
 
The exception is particularly useful in admitting e-mails, which, due to the 
seeming informality of the medium, often contain remarkably candid 
expressions of the writer’s state of mind.164  Social networking websites 
are also littered with expressions of their users’ states of mind.165 
 
4. Business Records 
 
[59] “[M]emorand[a], report[s], record[s], or data compilation[s] . . . 
made at or near the time [of an event] by, a person with knowledge” are  
excepted from the hearsay rule “if kept in the course of a regularly 
conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business [to keep such records].”166  If a custodian or qualified witness 
demonstrates these requirements through his testimony, the evidence may 
be admitted.167  This business records exception is often analyzed in 
conjunction with Rule 902(11) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
                                                
163 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 570 (citation omitted). 
 
164 See id. at 554 (“Perhaps because of the spontaneity and informality of e-mail, people 
tend to reveal more of themselves, for better or worse, than in other more deliberative 
forms of written communication.  For that reason, e-mail evidence often figures 
prominently in cases where state of mind, motive and intent must be proved.  Indeed, it is 
not unusual to see a case consisting almost entirely of e-mail evidence.”). 
 
165 See Susan W. Brenner, Internet Law in the Courts, 13 J. INTERNET L. 16, 18 (2009). 
 
166 FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 
167 Id.; see also Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Lozen Int’l, LLC, 285 F.3d 808, 819 (9th Cir. 
2002) (affirming the trial court’s admission of bills of lading under the business records 
exception after the custodian stated that the company kept the records in the ordinary 
course of business); United States v. Catabran, 836 F.2d 453, 457 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that the trial court properly admitted computer printouts under the business 
records exception after the custodian provided sufficient foundation); United States v. 
Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 89-90 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that telephone records were properly 
admitted as a business record because the custodian described how the records were 
prepared and maintained).   
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provides for the authentication of certified domestic records of regularly-
conducted business activities without extrinsic evidence.168   
  
[60] Business records are viewed as trustworthy, and therefore excepted 
from the hearsay rule, because they are kept by trained record keepers and 
regularly checked for accuracy.169  However, the business records 
exception is not limited to records made and kept by a “business.”  Rather 
the records of government agencies,170 private clubs,171 and individual 
households172 may all qualify under the exception. 
 
[61] It has been noted that “[t]he business record exception is one of the 
hearsay exceptions most discussed by courts when ruling on the 
admissibility of electronic evidence.”173  E-mails174 and computer-stored 
                                                
168 See supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing self-authentication under Rule 902(11)). 
 
169 See State v. Microsoft Corp., No. CIV A. 98-1233(CKK), 2002 WL 649951, at *2 
(D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2002) (citation omitted). 
 
170 See, e.g., United States v. Szehinskyj, 104 F. Supp. 2d 480, 491-92 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(admitting documents of the German government concerning the regulation of 
concentration camps under the business records exception because the records outlined 
the camps operations).   
 
171 See, e.g., Keogh v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 713 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the private diary of country club employee was admissible under the 
business records exception and rejecting the argument that the exception applies solely to 
commercial businesses). 
 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90, 98-99 (stating that if it were 
common household practice to compose e-mails following significant telephone 
conversations, such e-mails would be admissible under the business records exception). 
 
173 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 572 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
174 See Pierre v. RBC Liberty Life Ins., No. 05-1042-C, 2007 WL 2071829, at *2 (M.D. 
La. July 13, 2007) (finding that e-mails fell within Rule 803(6) because they “were 
prepared by . . . employees during the ordinary course of business”); DirecTV, Inc. v. 
Murray, 307 F. Supp. 2d 764, 772-73 (D.S.C. 2004) (finding that sales records contained 
in e-mails were admissible under the business records exception when sales orders were 
regularly received via e-mail and the e-mails were retained as records of each order); 
Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 348 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706 (E.D. Va. 2004) (noting 
that e-mails can qualify as business records).  But see Microsoft, 2002 WL 649951, at *2 
(declining to admit e-mails under the business records exception because there was a 
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and computer-generated records175 may qualify under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule, provided that they meet the requirements set 
forth in Rule 803(6).176  
 
5. Public Records 
 
[62] Also exempt from the hearsay rule are: 
 
[r]ecords, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any 
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the 
activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed 
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there 
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases 
matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and 
proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made 
pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of 
information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness.177  
 
[63] Public records are viewed as trustworthy because public officials 
are expected to perform their duties appropriately, but are unlikely to 
remember the details of those activities independent of the record 
                                                                                                                     
“complete lack of information regarding the practice of composition and maintenance of 
[the] e-mails”); Ferber, 966 F. Supp. at 99 (declining to admit e-mails under the business 
records exception because the author of the e-mails “was under no business duty to make 
and maintain” such e-mails). 
 
175 See United States v. Cestnik, 36 F.3d 904, 909-10 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
computer-generated money transfer records were admissible under the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule because the records were kept according to a standard 
procedure and in the normal course of business).   
 
176 See generally FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
 
177 FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
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created.178  Because public records are deemed to have a higher degree of 
accuracy than business records, the proponent of a public record typically 
is not required to provide foundational testimony to demonstrate a public 
record’s admissibility, whereas, to qualify under the business records 
exception, the proponent must adduce testimony from the custodian of the 
records or an otherwise qualified witness.179   
 
[64] Furthermore, “[p]ublic records and government documents are 
generally considered ‘not to be subject to reasonable dispute.’  This 
includes public records and government documents available from reliable 
sources on the Internet.”180  It does not appear “that any appellate court 
has passed definitively upon the admissibility as evidence of public 
records printed from a government website. . . . Trial courts have, 
however, found such copies admissible.”181  Courts have applied the 
public records exception to the hearsay rule to admit information 
displayed on the websites of the United States Census Bureau182 and the 
United States Postal Service.183  In addition, at least one court applied this 
exception to admit the public record of a foreign government.184  The 
                                                
178 See FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee’s note (citing Wong Wing Foo v. 
McGrath, 196 F.2d 120 (9th Cir. 1952)). 
 
179 Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 574 (D. Md. 2007); see United 
States v. Doyle, 130 F.3d 523, 546 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting that foundation witnesses are 
not required under Rule 803(8)).  
 
180 United States ex rel. Dingle v. Bioport Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (W.D. Mich. 
2003) (citation omitted). 
 
181 Bernstein v. City of New York, No. 28863/04, 2007 WL 283072, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Feb. 1, 2007) (citation omitted). 
 
182 See U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., No. 
Civ.A. 03-1605, 2004 WL 2347559, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (holding that a table 
of information compiled by the United States Census Bureau and printed from the Census 
Bureau’s website was admissible as a public record under Rule 803(8)). 
 
183 See Chapman v. S.F. Newspaper Agency, No. C 01-02305 CRB, 2002 WL 31119944, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2002) (holding that a printout of a page from the United States 
Postal Service website was admissible as a public record under Rule 803(8)(A)). 
 
184 See United States v. New-Form Mfg. Co., 277 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1326 (Ct. Int’l Trade 
2003) (holding that a record created from information available on the official website of 
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exception has also been applied to e-mails that otherwise met the 
requirements of Rule 803(8).185 
 
6.  Market Reports and Commercial Publications 
  
[65] The hearsay rule does not preclude the admission of “[m]arket 
quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, 
generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular 
occupations.”186  Such information is viewed as trustworthy, and worthy 
of hearsay exception, because of the public’s reliance on the material, 
which incentivizes the compiler of the information to provide accurate 
information.187 
  
[66] Nearly all of the market reports and commercial publications 
contemplated by this exception to the hearsay rule are now available on 
the Internet.188  Thus, whereas twenty years ago a court might have been 
asked to apply this exception to the National Automobile Dealers 
Association (NADA) “Blue Book,” which provides value information for 
new and used motor vehicles, the proponent of such evidence is now more 
likely to ask the court to admit value information from the NADA or 
                                                                                                                     
the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy Canada was admissible under Rule 
803(17)). 
 
185 See Lester v. Natsios, 290 F. Supp. 2d 11, 26 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that e-mails 
regarding a job vacancy at a government agency were admissible as public records under 
Rule 803(8)). 
 
186 FED. R. EVID. 803(17). 
 
187 FED. R. EVID. 803(17) advisory committee’s note. 
 
188 Cf. United States ex rel. Dingle v. Bioport Corp., 270 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972 (W.D. 
Mich. 2003). 
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Kelley’s websites.189  Both have been admitted to demonstrate the value of 
a motor vehicle.190  
 
VI.  PROVING THE CONTENT OF ELECTRONIC WRITINGS, 
RECORDINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
A.  Original Document Rule and Other Methods of Proving Contents 
  
[67] The Federal Rules of Evidence state that “[t]o prove the content of 
a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or 
photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by 
Act of Congress.”191  For data maintained on “a computer or similar 
device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the 
data accurately, is an ‘original.’”192  “A duplicate is admissible to the same 
extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the 
authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to 
admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”193   
 
[68] If the original is lost or destroyed (unless destroyed by the 
proponent of the evidence in bad faith), not obtainable by judicial practice, 
or in the possession of the proponent’s opponent, the original is not 
required and the proponent may seek to admit other “secondary” evidence 
of the content of the writing, recording, or photograph.194  Further, the 
                                                
189 See generally State v. Erickstad, 620 N.W.2d 136, 145 (N.D. 2000); see also Irby-
Greene v. M.O.R., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 n.22 (E.D. Va. 2000) (indicating the 
court’s reliance on the Kelley Blue Book Internet website for valuation of two vehicles). 
 
190 See Hess v. Riedel-Hess, 794 N.E.2d 96, 103 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (holding that the 
NADA appraisal guide printed from NADAguides.com was admissible pursuant to Ohio 
Rule of Evidence 803(17)); Erickstad, 620 N.W.2d at 145-46 (holding that the valuation 
information for a pickup truck found on the Kelley Blue Book website was admissible). 
 
191 FED. R. EVID. 1002. 
 
192 FED. R. EVID. 1001(3). 
 
193 FED. R. EVID. 1003. 
 
194 See FED. R. EVID. 1004. 
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proponent need not account for the missing original if the testimony or 
written admission of his opponent proves the content of the record.195  
Finally, if writings, recordings, or photographs are voluminous, their 
contents may be presented via summary, chart or calculation.196  In that 
case, the original writings, recordings, or photographs, or duplicates 
thereof, must be made available for examination or copying, or both, by 
other parties to the litigation. 
  
B.  Application to Electronic Evidence 
  
[69] Electronic evidence consists entirely of writings, recordings, and 
photographs.197  Accordingly, the original document rule applies whenever 
a party attempts to prove the contents of the electronic evidence.198   
E-mails, text messages, chat room dialogue, and other electronic records 
all qualify as writings because they consist of letters, words, or numbers 
set down by mechanical or electronic recording, or other forms of data 
compilation.199  Due to “the myriad ways that electronic records may be 
deleted, lost as a result of system malfunctions, purged as a result of 
routine electronic records management software (such as the automatic 
deletion of e-mail after a set period of time) or otherwise unavailable,”200 
                                                
195 See FED. R. EVID. 1007. 
 
196 FED. R. EVID. 1006. 
 
197 See FED. R. EVID. 1001(1). 
 
198 See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co, 241 F.R.D. 534, 578 (D. Md. 2007). 
 
199 See State v. Espiritu, 176 P.3d 885, 892 (Haw. 2008) (admitting printouts of text 
messages received by the victim and holding that the original text messages were not 
required under an exception to the original writing rule, which excuses the production of 
an original or duplicate if the original was lost or destroyed absent bad faith on the part of 
the proponent); Adams v. State, 117 P.3d 1210, 1218 (Wy. 2005) (admitting computer 
printouts of a chat room dialogue between the defendant and a police officer where “[t]he 
State’s witness testified that the chat log exhibits were exact copies of the communication 
between the parties contained on the computer and thus, they were either appropriate 
computer ‘originals’ or duplicates which were properly authenticated.”). 
 
200 Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 580. 
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proponents must often resort to secondary evidence to prove their 
contents.201 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
[70] Though certain issues, such as authentication, may be more 
complicated in the context of electronic evidence, traditional evidentiary 
principles can be consistently adapted to address questions regarding the 
admissibility of electronic evidence.  Guided by the Lorraine model and 
the cases cited in this article, the proponent of electronic evidence should 
have little difficulty successfully moving the admission of his or her 
evidence.  When all else fails, comparison of the electronic evidence with 
its most similar non-electronic analogue will enable a proponent to draw 
upon the court’s familiarity with traditional evidentiary principles to 
provide comfort in the trustworthiness of the electronic evidence.  As one 
court has said, “[t]he potentially limitless application of computer 
technology to evidentiary questions will continually require legal 
adaptation.” 202  That adaptation must necessarily begin with the 
proponents of electronic evidence.  
  
 
                                                
201 See Espiritu, 176 P.3d at 893 (admitting secondary evidence of the content of text 
messages where the witness no longer had the text messages at issue because she no 
longer had the cellular telephone or cellular telephone service from the provider through 
which she had received the messages); see also United States v. Hunter, 266 F. App’x 
619, 621-22 (9th Cir. 2008) (admitting excerpts of a series of text messages as summaries 
under Rule 1006 and holding that, “if the defendant objects to the summary of the 
evidence, he cannot have the evidence excluded, but instead, can compel the government 
to introduce the rest of the incomplete evidence.”). 
 
202 Penny v. Commonwealth, 370 S.E.2d 314, 317 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). 
